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A White Paper from the Institute for Consumer Antitrust
Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law

Use of Dominance, Unlawful Conduct, and Causation under
Section 36 of the New Zealand Commerce Act: A US
Perspective

Jeffery M. Cross
J. Douglas Richards
Maurice E. Stucke
Spencer Weber Waller
The proper interpretation of the abuse of dominance provisions in Section 36 of
the New Zealand Commerce Act has been a matter of controversy. The courts of New
Zealand have taken a view of the requirements of this important provision of competition
law in a narrow and formal manner that makes it very difficult to take enforcement action
against conduct which has a net anticompetitive effect, but which has no, or at best
minimal, business or procompetitive justification. We offer this white paper to provide a
United States perspective to suggest that the current counterfactual test applied by the
courts of New Zealand is not an effective enforcement tool and significantly out of step
with the interpretation of unilateral conduct by dominant firms in the United States.

I.

About Us
The Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies (“Institute”) is a non-partisan,

independent academic center at Loyola University Chicago School of Law designed to
explore the impact of antitrust enforcement on the individual consumer and the public,
and to shape policy issues. The Institute promotes a more competitive, consumer friendly
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economy through a comprehensive, inclusive view of the benefits of competition law and
policy that includes, yet goes beyond, narrow notions of economic efficiency.1
The Institute does not take positions on individual cases, but does comment on
issues of interest and importance in the competition law and consumer protection field.
Over the years, the Institute has submitted views and testimony on various competition
and consumer issues to state and federal agencies and legislatures throughout the United
States as well as competition authorities in Canada, the European Union, and other
jurisdictions.
We write entirely from a United States perspective. The authors of this white
paper are all United States professors or practitioners of antitrust law.2 Professor Waller
is the director of the Institute and the other authors are all active members of the Institute
Advisory Board. At the request of Mark Berry, chairman of the New Zealand Commerce
Commission, we have familiarized ourselves with the current New Zealand jurisprudence
on Section 36,3 but do not hold ourselves out as experts on New Zealand or Australian
competition law.

We also recognize the important substantive differences between

United States law based on monopolization and the New Zealand statute prohibiting the
use of a dominant position for certain prohibited purposes. We write to inform the New
Zealand competition community of the U.S. experience on these issues and to suggest
potential improvements in the interpretation or revision of the New Zealand Commerce
Act to better implement the common goals of unilateral conduct provisions to prohibit the
harm to markets, consumers, and competition by the unilateral misuse of market power
by dominant enterprises.
1

Full information on the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies is available at
http://www.luc.edu/antitrust.
2
Jeffery Cross is a partner in the firm of Freeborn & Peters in Chicago, Illinois; J. Douglas Richards is a
partner in the law firm of Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll in New York, New York; Maurice Stucke is an
Associate Professor at the University of Tennessee College of Law; and Spencer Weber Waller is a
Professor and Director of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School
of Law. The authors volunteered their time on this project in their individual capacities. This white paper
has been reviewed by the full Advisory Boards of the Institute prior to submission, but only represents the
personal views of the authors. The authors have also benefitted from helpful comments from Mark Berry,
John Preston, Peter Watts, and anonymous referees from the New Zealand Business Law Quarterly.
3
Among the materials we have reviewed include the decision in Commerce Commission v. Telecom Corp.
of New Zealand Ltd, SC 76/2009, [2010] NZSC 111 and the cases cited therein, and commentary on the
Telecom decision, including IAN EAGLES & LOUISE LONGDIN, REFUSALS TO LICENSE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: TESTING THE LIMITS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS181-195 (2011); Paul G. Scott, Taking a Wrong
Turn? The Supreme Court and Section 36 of the Commerce Act, 17 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 260 (September 2011).
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II.

The Telecom Decision
The 2001 version Section 36(2) of the New Zealand Commerce Act states:
A person that has a substantial degree of power in a market must not take
advantage of that power for the purpose of—
(a) restricting the entry of a person into that or any other market; or
(b) preventing or deterring a person from engaging in competitive conduct in
that or any other market; or
(c) eliminating a person from that or any other market.4

It is our understanding that the New Zealand Supreme Court in its 2010 decision of
Commerce Commission v. Telecom Corp. of New Zealand Ltd. (hereinafter Telecom)5
interpreted this provision that a defendant only “uses” or “takes advantage” of its market
power to achieve the prohibited purposes if it would not have engaged in the same
conduct had it lacked market power.6 This “counterfactual” or “comparative” test was
the principal basis for concluding that Telecom Corp. of New Zealand did not violate
Section 36. As the court stated:
All the relevant reasoning involves, either expressly or implicitly,
consideration of what the dominant firm would have done in a competitive
market; that is, in a market in which hypothetically it is not dominant. The
essential point is that if the dominant firm would, as a matter of
commercial judgment, have acted in the same way in a hypothetically
competitive market, it cannot logically be said that its dominance has
given it the advantage that is implied in the concepts of using or taking
advantage of dominance or a substantial degree of market power.
Conversely, if the dominant firm would not have acted in the same way in
a hypothetically competitive market, it can logically be said that its
dominance did give it the necessary advantage. This is because it can then
reasonably be concluded that it was its dominance or substantial degree of

4

Section
36
Commerce Act,
Public
Act
No
5,
as
amended, available
at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1986/0005/latest/DLM87623.html.
5
SC 76/2009, [2010] NZSC 111.
6
Telecom, at ¶ 31. This case involved the older language of Section 36(2) but the same interpretive
principles as currently in effect.
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market power that caused, enabled or facilitated its acting as it did in the
actual market.7
The Court reasoned that:
The comparative exercise is designed to pose and answer the question
whether the presence of competition in the hypothetical market would
have restrained the alleged contravener from acting in that market in the
same way as it acted in the actual market. If the answer is yes, the alleged
contravener has taken advantage of its market power. If the answer is no,
it has not done so, because the presence of that power gave it no material
advantage. The need to make this comparison is inherent in the idea of
“use” of dominance or substantial market power under s 36 whatever the
conduct in issue may be, albeit the comparison may be more easily made
in some cases than others. And the need to make this comparison is also
supported by the concepts of dominance and market power themselves. It
is helpful to bear in mind what those concepts involve when considering
what s 36 envisages by its reference to their use.8
The counterfactual test is derived from the assumption that a firm with monopoly power
behaves differently than a firm in a competitive market. “A firm has market power when
it is not constrained in the way in which it would be constrained in a competitive
market.”9 So the issue of whether defendant has monopoly power relates to the issue of
whether defendant used its monopoly power:
The question whether dominance or substantial market power exists implies a
comparison between the position of the firm in the actual market and a firm in
the same general circumstances but otherwise in a workably competitive market.
The contrast inherent in the concepts of dominance or substantial degree of
market power is the contrast between the actual market and a hypothetically
competitive market. That same contrast is inherent in the inquiry into whether
market power has been “used” within the meaning of s 36.10
Accordingly an antitrust plaintiff must prove “on the balance of probabilities” that
the defendant “would not have acted as it did in a workably competitive market; that
is, if it had not been dominant.”11

7

Telecom, at ¶ 31.
Id. at ¶ 32.
9
Id. at ¶ 33.
10
Id.
11
Id. at ¶ 34.
8
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III.

United States Law
The contours of Section 2 of the Sherman Act have evolved over more than a

century of jurisprudence. 12 Aspects of its interpretation, however, are not without
controversy. Nevertheless, some well-accepted principles have been established.
To prevail under section 2, the antitrust plaintiff must prove that the defendant
monopolized or attempted to monopolize a market. For the monopoly maintenance claim,
plaintiff must show that defendant possesses monopoly (or monopsony) power, and
second, “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident.”13 For an attempted monopolization claim, plaintiff must prove (1) that
the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific
intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.14
A leading case on U.S. monopolization law is United States v. Microsoft Corp.15
The en banc United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit outlined the key
principles from a century of case law on monopolization under § 2:
First, to be condemned
“anticompetitive effect.”
thereby harm consumers.
suffice. “The [Sherman

as exclusionary, a monopolist's act must have an
That is, it must harm the competitive process and
In contrast, harm to one or more competitors will not
Act] directs itself not against conduct which is

12

Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ….
13
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-571 (1966); see also In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig.,
801 F. Supp. 2d 705, 724 (E.D. Tenn. 2011) (setting out same elements for monopsony claim under § 2 of
the Sherman Act).
14
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
15
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam). While there have been subsequent United States Supreme
Court cases addressing narrow aspects of the application of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to specific
business practices, these cases did not set forth a general framework for the application of U.S.
monopolization law. See, e.g., Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S.
398 (2004) (refusals to deal in highly regulated telecommunications market); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. RossSimmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007) (alleged predatory buying); Pacific Bell Tel. v.
Linkline Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009) (alleged price squeeze). See generally Spencer
Weber Waller, Microsoft and Trinko: A Tale of Two Courts, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 741 (arguing for
authoritative status of Microsoft opinion).
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competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to
destroy competition itself.” . . .
Second, the plaintiff, on whom the burden of proof of course rests, must
demonstrate that the monopolist's conduct indeed has the requisite
anticompetitive effect. In a case brought by a private plaintiff, the plaintiff must
show that its injury is “of ‘the type that the statute was intended to forestall,’ ”
no less in a case brought by the Government, it must demonstrate that the
monopolist's conduct harmed competition, not just a competitor.
Third, if a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case under § 2 by
demonstrating anticompetitive effect, then the monopolist may proffer a
“procompetitive justification” for its conduct. If the monopolist asserts a
procompetitive justification-a nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a
form of competition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater
efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal-then the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to rebut that claim.
Fourth, if the monopolist's procompetitive justification stands unrebutted, then
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct
outweighs the procompetitive benefit. In cases arising under § 1 of the Sherman
Act, the courts routinely apply a similar balancing approach under the rubric of
the “rule of reason.” . . .
Finally, in considering whether the monopolist's conduct on balance harms
competition and is therefore condemned as exclusionary for purposes of § 2, our
focus is upon the effect of that conduct, not upon the intent behind it. Evidence
of the intent behind the conduct of a monopolist is relevant only to the extent it
helps us understand the likely effect of the monopolist's conduct.16
Two things are notable from the court’s discussion of U.S. monopolization law. First is
its focus on actual or likely anticompetitive effects on the competitive process. Second is
the role of intent.
One issue that arose was the necessary causal link between Microsoft's conduct, in
particular its foreclosure of its potential rivals’ distribution channels, and the maintenance
of its operating system monopoly. The court said,
Microsoft points to no case, and we can find none, standing for the proposition
that, as to § 2 liability in an equitable enforcement action, plaintiffs must present

16

Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-59 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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direct proof that a defendant's continued monopoly power is precisely
attributable to its anticompetitive conduct.17
The D.C. Circuit was also wary about hinging § 2 liability on a “plaintiff's ability or
inability to reconstruct the hypothetical marketplace absent a defendant's anticompetitive
conduct.” 18

This “would only encourage monopolists to take more and earlier

anticompetitive action.” 19

The court instead said it would infer causation when

exclusionary conduct is aimed at producers of nascent competitive technologies as well
as when it is aimed at producers of established substitutes:
Admittedly, in the former case there is added uncertainty, inasmuch as
nascent threats are merely potential substitutes. But the underlying proof
problem is the same-neither plaintiffs nor the court can confidently
reconstruct a product's hypothetical technological development in a world
absent the defendant's exclusionary conduct. To some degree, “the
defendant is made to suffer the uncertain consequences of its own
undesirable conduct.”20
As a general principle, the more harmful the challenged conduct is to societal
welfare, the less probative is the defendant’s intent. When the behavior is predictably
anticompetitive, the U.S. courts typically infer improper intent from the conduct itself.21
So the more anticompetitive the conduct, the more likely the court infers the requisite
anticompetitive intent, the more skeptical the court will be over defendant’s proffered
good intentions, and the less need there is for discovery on defendant’s good or bad
intentions (or what the defendant would have done if it lacked monopoly power). The
enquiry can be said to stop with clear anticompetitive effects, as intent evidence’s
incremental value is slight.

IV.

The Problems with Counterfactual Analysis
The "counterfactual test" adopted by the New Zealand Supreme Court in

Commerce Commission v. Telecom -- requiring that the dominant firm "would not have
17

Id. at 79.
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. (quoting 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 651c, at 78 (1996)).
21
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603 (1985).
18
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acted as it did" had it "not been dominant" -- is at odds with the structure and purpose of
the United States law of monopolization in several fundamental ways.
Most basically, defendant’s liability depends on what it may or may not have
done in a counterfactual world. We share the New Zealand Supreme Court’s concern of
the rule of law, namely the importance “when addressing the statutory concept of use of
market power to take an approach which gives firms and their advisers a reasonable basis
for predicting in advance whether their proposed conduct falls foul of s 36 and risks a
substantial financial penalty.” 22 But this counterfactual standard requires the antitrust
plaintiffs and courts to reconstruct with confidence what a hypothetical firm in a world
absent the defendant's exclusionary conduct would have done.

Although the New

Zealand Court instructs that the enforcers’ and lower courts’ “judgment must be made
objectively and should be informed by all those factors that would influence rational
business people in the hypothetical circumstances which the inquiry envisages,”23 the U.S.
courts believe that neither plaintiffs nor they can confidently, accurately, and predictably
do so with the available economic tools.24 Moreover, the U.S. courts believe that this
but-for analysis would be too deferential to the monopolist.25 Consequently, it is highly
unlikely that enforcers, courts, and economists can consistent with the rule of law
objectively reconstruct a hypothetically competitive market, never tainted by defendant’s
anticompetitive conduct.

22

Telecom, at ¶ 30.
Id. at ¶ 35.
24
Indeed one growth area in the economic literature is behavioral economics, which from empirical lab and
field studies, suggests that market participants are not rational profit-maximizers with perfect willpower.
See, e.g., Hearing on Competition and Behavioural Economics, Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and
Development,
Paris,
France
(June
2012),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/liberalisationandcompetitioninterventioninregulatedsectors/discussionpaper
sfromrecentandforthcomingcompetitionmeetings.htm#Beh_Eco.
Thus, constructing a hypothetical
universe based on rational market participants would be an altogether different universe from the current
marketplace.
25
In Microsoft, for example, the court rejected a test that but for the monopolist's behavior, the competitors
actually would have developed into viable substitutes. The court found it "inimical to the purpose of the
Sherman Act to allow monopolists free reign to squash nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at willparticularly in industries marked by rapid technological advance and frequent paradigm shifts." Microsoft,
253 F.3d at 79.
23
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Second, the focus under U.S. law is the likely or actual competitive effects of the
defendant's conduct. The disjunction between these two regimes is illustrated, for
example, by the fact that United States monopolization law recognizes that firms can act
for multiple purposes.

A firm can acquire its competitor for efficiencies and/or to

monopolize the market. So whether firms with or without market power would have
engaged in that conduct does not necessarily preclude anticompetitive purpose or effect.
A person who lacks monopoly power can lawfully engage in the same conduct that can
motivate a monopolist to unlawfully injure competition. As the court in Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. noted:
Such conduct is illegal when taken by a monopolist because it tends to destroy
competition, although in the hands of a smaller market participant it might be
considered harmless, or even ‘honestly industrial.’26
For example, a firm may seek to merge with an important supplier to raise its
rivals’ costs, to secure a monopoly, and to obtain productive efficiencies. Under either a
consumer welfare or a total welfare standard, the competition authority would not likely
challenge the merger if the firm lacked market power. The fact that the merger would
likely have occurred in the “but for” world (for the purpose of obtaining the efficiencies)
does not legalize the anticompetitive merger. Nor does the counterfactual prove what
primarily motivated defendant in pursuing this merger.
Third, under United States law, a dominant and weak firm may engage in the
same conduct, but the conduct’s competitive effects and legality differ. A monopolist in
the United States could not immunize its anticompetitive conduct (such as exclusive
dealing and tying) simply by showing that firms without monopoly power also engage in
the same conduct.27

26

603 F.2d 263, 275 (2nd Cir. 1979).
Jefferson Parrish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (per se unlawful tying requires market
power over tying item); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (unlawful exclusive
dealing requires market power on the part of the defendant); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S.
143 (1951) (unilateral refusal to deal unlawful only if part of scheme to monopolize).
27
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As these examples show, the United States monopolization law does not
exonerate a monopolist from liability merely for being able to show that it might have
engaged in the same conduct when it lacked market power.
The larger problem with the counterfactual test is its assumption that a firm with
monopoly power somehow behaves differently than firms in a competitive market. At
times this is true. Courts in the United States, for example, do consider evidence that
defendant acted in a way that it could not if defendant had not been dominant. Indeed
such evidence may be relevant in proving defendant’s monopoly. The lower court in
Microsoft found that some aspects of Microsoft's behavior difficult to explain unless
Windows was a monopoly product. 28 For example, Microsoft set the price of its
Windows operating system without considering rivals' prices, “something a firm without
a monopoly would have been unable to do.” 29
But the fact that a monopolist sometimes acts differently does not mean it always
acts differently.

Accordingly we do not claim that “counterfactual” evidence is

necessarily irrelevant in U.S. cases. It simply is not dispositive. It is noteworthy that the
U.S. courts do not require direct proof of monopoly. Microsoft argued that it was not a
monopoly because it did not behave like a monopolist:
Claiming that software competition is uniquely “dynamic,” the company
suggests a new rule: that monopoly power in the software industry should
be proven directly, that is, by examining a company's actual behavior to
determine if it reveals the existence of monopoly power. According to
Microsoft, not only does no such proof of its power exist, but record
evidence demonstrates the absence of monopoly power. The company
claims that it invests heavily in research and development, . . .(testifying
that Microsoft invests approximately 17% of its revenue in R&D)), and
charges a low price for Windows (a small percentage of the price of an
Intel-compatible PC system and less than the price of its rivals.30
The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument as contrary to U.S. case law: “Microsoft
cites no case, nor are we aware of one, requiring direct evidence to show monopoly

28

Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58.
Id.
30
Id. at 56-57 (citations omitted).
29
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power in any market. We decline to adopt such a rule now.”31 One reason is that rarely is
there a line that clearly demarcates what a defendant would or would not do if it
possessed (or lacked) monopoly power:
Microsoft's pricing behavior is similarly equivocal. The company claims
only that it never charged the short-term profit-maximizing price for
Windows. Faced with conflicting expert testimony, the District Court
found that it could not accurately determine what this price would be. In
any event, the court found, a price lower than the short-term profitmaximizing price is not inconsistent with possession or improper use of
monopoly power. . . . Microsoft never claims that it did not charge the
long-term monopoly price. Microsoft does argue that the price of
Windows is a fraction of the price of an Intel-compatible PC system and
lower than that of rival operating systems, but these facts are not
inconsistent with the District Court's finding that Microsoft has monopoly
power.32
So U.S. courts recognize that monopolists at times can do some things that firms
without market power cannot. But U.S. courts also recognize that monopolists and fringe
firms can do the same things for different reasons and with different competitive
consequences.
Thus New Zealand law is significantly more restrictive than U.S. law on whether
the defendant used its position of dominance.

On the related third issue--whether

dominance has been used for a proscribed purpose—a different proceeding involving
Telecom held that this “may be inferred from evidence that the conduct had an
anticompetitive effect or shown by direct evidence of what the conduct was intended to
achieve.” 33 While the U.S. antitrust community has debated the role of intent in
monopoly law,34 the U.S and New Zealand law here with respect to this third issue is not

31

Id. at 57.
Id. (emphasis added)
33
Judgment of Rodney Hansen J and Professor Martin Richardson, in Commerce Commission v. Telecom
Corporation of New Zealand Limited And Anor HC AK CIV 2004-404-1333 [9 October 2009], at ¶ 12,
available at http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Publication.3912.html. Liability and penalties in this
subsequent and unrelated case involving Telecom were upheld in Telecom Corp. v. Commerce
Commission, [2012] NZCA 278, [2012] NZCA 344. While these decisions show that Section 36 is not
entirely a dead letter, they do not address the counterfactual analysis at the heart of Section 36’s weakness
as an enforcement tool.
34
Maurice E. Stucke, Is Intent Relevant?, Journal of Law, Economics & Policy (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1992761.
32
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that far apart. Indeed considering the conduct's "purpose," perhaps justifying the Court's
conclusion in Commerce Commission v. Telecom, can be helpful in determining whether
the firm has monopoly power.

Conclusion
Under both U.S. and New Zealand law, difficult fact issues may arise when the
motives and effects of the challenged conduct are mixed. Both bodies of law resolve
those issues by putting the ultimate burden of proof on the plaintiff.

Thus, while

complicating the analysis procedurally through various rules providing for the shifting of
burdens of coming forward with more evidence, the United States antitrust law ultimately
puts the burden on the plaintiff to show that anticompetitive effects of the challenged
conduct outweigh any pro-competitive effects that it might have. Similarly, the Court in
Commerce Commission v. Telecom found the defendant not liable because the
government failed to carry its ultimate burden to show that the same conduct would not
have been engaged in in the absence of market power.
But it appears to us that the "counterfactual test" – perhaps unintentionally –
creates a significant exception for a monopolist’s willfully anticompetitive behavior. The
fact that a monopolist would have acted similarly in the counterfactual world does not
necessarily mean it lacked an anticompetitive purpose: it simply means that the firm had
mixed motives. So too, the counterfactual test appears to excuse behavior where actual
anticompetitive effects are relatively clear.
The United States courts do not believe that it is fair or reasonable to inquire what
would have happened in a hypothetical world not tainted by monopoly. The belief is that
plaintiffs and courts cannot assess confidently, objectively, and with consistent accuracy
what someone without market power would have done. Proving with confidence a firm’s
intent can be difficult. It becomes even more difficult to establish when one goes beyond
defendant’s actual motive in the real world (which courts can infer from the conduct’s
likely or actual competitive effects), to what a firm “would have done" in some
counterfactual, hypothetical world. More importantly, it fails to accurately determine the
12
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key question in unilateral conduct cases of the net anticompetitive effect of the
defendant’s conduct.
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